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The Fourth Amendment of the UnitedStates Constitution protects the rightof the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures by requiring a prob-
able cause showing in order to obtain a
warrant before conducting such searches.1
Since the United States Supreme Court
decided Terry v. Ohio2 in 1968, however,
the words of the Fourth Amendment have
been questioned and the rights of the
individual challenged.  When the Court
decided Illinois v. Wardlow3 in 2000, it was
made clear that the words once written to
protect all Americans do not pertain to
those residing in locations deemed “high-
crime areas.”4
In Terry, the Supreme Court held that
law enforcement officials could stop and
frisk an individual, without probable
cause, if there was a reasonable suspicion
that the individual is involved in criminal
activity.5 During the next 25 years, many
cases fleshed out Terry’s rules, gradually
requiring less and less evidence for a stop
and frisk.6 Most recently, the Supreme
Court expanded Terry to include justify-
ing a stop and frisk of those located in
high-crime areas who take flight upon
seeing the police in Illinois v. Wardlow.7
In Wardlow, two officers were patrolling
an area known for heavy narcotics traf-
ficking.8 The officers stopped and frisked
a man who took flight upon seeing them.9
They discovered a .38 caliber handgun
and arrested the man.10
The Illinois trial court held that the
gun was recovered during a lawful stop
and frisk.11 The Illinois Court of Appeals
reversed, concluding that the officers did
not have enough supporting evidence to
show that the location of the stop and
frisk was a high-crime area; thus, the offi-
cers lacked grounds for reasonable suspi-
cion.12 The Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed, but rejected the intermediate
appellate court’s reasoning and found that
sudden flight in a location deemed a high-
crime area by police is insufficient to cre-
ate reasonable suspicion.13
The United States Supreme Court
reversed.14 The Court found that while
headlong flight is not indicative of wrong-
doing it is certainly suggestive of such.15
The Court held that Wardlow’s presence
in a high-crime area and unprovoked
flight justifiably led police to believe that
he was involved in criminal activity.16
This article first progressively examines
how the Supreme Court has developed
exceptions and limitations to Fourth
Amendment protection.  Next, it analyzes
the reasoning of the majority and dissent-
ing opinions in Illinois v. Wardlow.  Finally,
it analyzes the effect that Wardlow will have
on future Fourth Amendment cases and
concludes that this decision grants the
state more power to protect its citizens at
the cost of subjecting low-income, primar-
ily minority, Americans to disproportion-
ately higher instances of personal invasion.  
THE STEADY PROGRESSION OF 
STATE DOMINANCE OVER
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Reasonable Suspicion Replaces
Probable Cause
The Supreme Court broke new ground
when deciding Terry v. Ohio.  For the first
time, questions referring to the restric-
tions placed on law enforcement officials
to conduct legal searches and seizures
were being raised.  Law enforcement was
looking to the Court for a little latitude in
the “probable cause” requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.  Their argument was
that this would allow them to better fulfill
their duties and obligations to the public,
while protecting themselves from unnec-
essary risks; the cost being a relatively
slight intrusion on the individual.17 The
Court agreed and held it constitutional to
perform a “stop and frisk” with less than
probable cause.18
In Terry, a plainclothes officer was
walking his usual beat when he observed
two men standing on a corner.19 After
watching the men for some time, their
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7. 528 U.S. at 120.
8. Id. at 121.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 122.
12. 684 N.E.2d 1341 (Ill. App. 1997).
13. 701 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1998).
14. 528 U.S. at 123.
15. Id. at 124.
16. Id. 
17. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10, 12.
18. Id. at 27.
19. Id. at 7.
conduct suggested they were planning to
rob a nearby jewelry store.20 The officer
approached the men, identified himself as
a police officer and asked for their
names.21 When they “mumbled some-
thing” in response to his inquires, the offi-
cer patted down the outside of the defen-
dant’s clothing and discovered a pistol in
the breast pocket of his overcoat.22
The Supreme Court found that the offi-
cer’s stopping of the men was a “seizure”
under the Fourth Amendment and that
the officer had acted without probable
cause.23 The Court then weighed these
factors against the state’s interests of crime
prevention and protection of its police
officers.24 Upon evaluation, the Court
held that there must be a narrowly drawn
authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police
officer when he has reason to believe that
he is dealing with an armed and danger-
ous individual, regardless of whether he
has probable cause to arrest the individual
for a crime.25
To create the balance that needed to be
struck in this type of case, the Court
formed a two-part test.26 First, the officer
must be able to point to specific and artic-
ulable facts that, taken together with ratio-
nal inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant the intrusion.27 Due weight must
be given, not to the officer’s inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,”
but to the specific reasonable inferences
that he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience.28 Second, the sus-
pect must be believed to be armed and
dangerous and the frisk must be limited to
that which is necessary for the discovery of
weapons that might be used to harm the
officer or others nearby.29
Terry gave police the power to stop and
frisk civilians when they reasonably
believe criminal activity is afoot during
street encounters, but limited that power
by excluding an officer’s unsubstantiated
suspicion.   What the Court did not do
was to explain what the boundaries were
concerning reasonable suspicion and
hunches.  What did the Court believe the
proper balance was between a precaution-
ary frisk for police protection and an
unjustifiable intrusion into an individual’s
privacy?  Four years after Terry, this issue
presented itself in Adams v. Williams,30
when the Supreme Court was asked if rea-
sonable suspicion could be inferred from
a tip received by an informant and not
from actual events witnessed by the offi-
cer himself.31
In Adams, an officer was patrolling a
high-crime area when an informant told
him that an individual seated in a nearby
car was in possession of a gun and nar-
cotics.32 Acting on this tip, the officer
approached the parked car and asked the
man inside to step out.33 When the sus-
pect opted to roll down the window
instead, the officer reached into the car
and removed a fully loaded revolver from
the man’s waistband, precisely the place
indicated by the informant.34
The Supreme Court agreed with the
state and found that reasonable cause can
be based on information supplied by
another person.35 The Court held that in
instances when a credible informant
warns of a specific impending crime it is
justifiable that the officer act on his tip
and conduct a further investigation.36
The decisions in Terry and Adams gave
the lower courts a reference point to look
to when deciding whether to suppress evi-
dence produced from a stop and frisk.
From Terry, it was understood that a
police officer might stop and frisk an indi-
vidual with a reasonable suspicion that the
person was involved in criminal activity.  It
was also understood that officers were
expected to use their experience to draw
rational inferences that would then lead to
reasonable suspicion.  Adams supple-
mented Terry by allowing a tip received
from an informant to be used to create a
reasonable suspicion.  However the lower
courts still did not know at this point what
was not a sufficient basis for a Terry stop.
The Supreme Court got an opportunity to
answer this in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce,37 and later in Brown v. Texas.38
A Look into What Is Not a Sufficient
Basis for Reasonable Suspicion
In Brignoni-Ponce, the issue before the
Supreme Court was whether to allow the
Border Patrol to stop vehicles solely
because the driver or occupants appeared
to be of Mexican descent.39 The Supreme
Court balanced the public interest served
by the prevention of illegal aliens with the
interference of individual liberty that
results when an officer stops an automo-
bile and questions its occupants.40 The
Court concluded that to allow patrol stops
of all vehicles, without any suspicion that
the vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants,
would subject the residents of these and
other areas to potentially unlimited inter-
ference with their use of highways, solely
at the discretion of Border Patrol offi-
cers.41
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23. Id. at 16, 20. The Court defined a “seizure” as whenever a police
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away.  These seizures were then described as more than a “petty
indignity,” but a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,
which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment.
Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 21-27.
25. Id. at 27.
26. Id. at 20-27.
27. Id. at 21.
28. Id. at 27.  
29. Id. at 26.
30. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
31. Id. at 144.
32. Id. at 144-45.
33. Id. at 145.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 147.
36. Id. at 146-47; see id. at 156-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting
that the only tip the informant had given the officer previously
pertained to alleged homosexual conduct in a local train station;
the officer used the tip to conduct a further investigation that
resulted neither in an arrest nor in any finding of substantiating
evidence).  
37. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
38. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
39. 422 U.S. at 874.
40. Id. at 878-89.
41. Id. at 880, 882.
Although the Court held it unconsti-
tutional to allow the Border Patrol to stop
drivers strictly due to ethnicity, it did go
on to conclude that the likelihood that
any given person of Mexican ancestry is
an alien is high enough to make Mexican
appearance a relevant factor in determin-
ing reasonable suspicion.42 The Court
permitted trained officers to use this fac-
tor, along with others,43 to create rational
inferences that would lead to reasonable
suspicion.44
With this new limit set on Terry, the
Court would next have to decide whether
reasonable suspicion was created when an
individual was observed in a high-crime
area, in Brown v. Texas.  
In Brown, officers were patrolling an
area of El Paso with a high incidence of
drug traffic when they saw a man
unknown to them who looked suspi-
cious.45 The officers stopped and ques-
tioned the man.46 When he refused to
identify himself, the officers frisked and
arrested him, charging him with violating
a Texas statute that made it a criminal act
for a person to refuse to give his name and
address to an officer.47
The Supreme Court found that there
was no basis for suspecting Brown of any
misconduct.48 The fact that he was in a
neighborhood frequented by drug users,
standing alone, was not a basis for con-
cluding that he was himself engaged in
criminal conduct.49
In Brignoni-Ponce and Brown, the
Supreme Court began to set limits on
what could constitute a Terry stop.  No
longer could one’s ethnicity be the sole
cause for reasonable suspicion, nor could
one’s location in a high-crime area.  The
pendulum seemed to swing, although
slightly, back in the direction of protect-
ing an individual’s right to freedom from
police intrusions.  After Brown, though,
the pendulum began to swing back in
favor of law enforcement and protecting
the states’ interests in preventing crime,
beginning with United States v. Cortez50
and United States v. Sokolow.51
The Supreme Court Reinforces Its
Belief in Law Enforcement’s Ability
to Define Reasonable Suspicion 
Cortez concerned the stop of a vehi-
cle believed to be transporting illegal
aliens.52 In deciding Cortez, and to clarify
which factors constituted sufficient cause
for a Terry stop, the Court devised the
“whole picture” test.  Instead of making a
specific factor a per se rule of law in deter-
mining reasonable suspicion, all the cir-
cumstances and evidence are to be exam-
ined and weighed accordingly by law
enforcement officials.53 Although this
gave a great amount of power to officers
to determine inferences based on the evi-
dence they had weighed, the Court
believed this power was warranted since
some inferences and deductions can elude
an untrained person.54
In United States v. Sokolow, the Court
needed to determine whether the “whole
picture” test would include stopping an
individual at an airport for committing a
large cluster of innocent activities that
could also be associated with the trans-
porting of narcotics. 55 Sokolow involved
a nervous young man traveling under an
alias to a known drug-trafficking city,
Miami, who paid for his ticket with
$2,100 in cash.56 He did not check his
luggage and was traveling from Honolulu,
a 20-hour round-trip flight, to stay in
Miami for only 48 hours.57
The Court found that although any of
these factors by itself may not be proof of
illegal conduct, taken together they
amount to reasonable suspicion.58 Thus,
Sokolow reemphasizes the message that
lower courts should defer to law enforce-
ment and its collective knowledge and
experience in passing upon the propriety
of Terry stops.59
DOES LOCATION PLUS EVASION
EQUAL REASONABLE SUSPICION?  
State Courts Were Split
The Supreme Court previously deter-
mined in Brown v. Texas that an individ-
ual’s location in a high-crime area alone is
insufficient to provide reasonable suspi-
cion, but, until Wardlow, it had yet to hear
a case that involved whether evasion from
the police in a high-crime area would con-
stitute a Terry stop. State courts were split
three ways on deciding this issue.  Some
believed that evasion from police alone
was sufficient grounds for a Terry stop,60
for others an evasion from police in a
high-crime area was sufficient,61 but still
38 Court Review - Winter 2002
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44. Id. at 884.
45. 433 U.S. at 48-50.
46. Id. at 49.
47. Id. at 49.  
48. Id. at 52.
49. Id. 
50. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
51. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
52. 449 U.S. at 413-15.
53. Id. at 418.
54. Id.  
55. 490 U.S. at 3.
56. Id. at 4-6.
57. Id. at 4-6.
58. Id. at 10.  Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).  Decided six
years before Sokolow, the Supreme Court held in Royer that it
could not allow every nervous young man exhibiting multiple
characteristics that meet the “drug courier profile” to be arrested
and held to answer for trafficking drugs.  See id. at 504-07.  
59. Harris, supra note 6, at 507.  
60. See State v. Anderson, 454 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1990)(allowing
police officers to stop an individual engaging in flight upon sight-
ing law enforcement officers). See also Harris, supra note 6, at
673, n.137 (1994) (citing four other courts concluding that
merely avoiding the police is enough to justify a Terry stop).
61. See Harris v. State, 423 S.E.2d 723 (Ga. App. 1992) (finding that
a defendant’s flight after observing police car in high-drug area
gave officer sufficient articulable suspicion to conduct stop and
frisk). 
others believed neither scenario was
acceptable.62 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Wardlow to clarify whether a
location-plus-evasion stop was constitu-
tional and set forth a bright-line rule. 
The Supreme Court Resolves the
Issue 
Officers Nolan and Harvey were work-
ing as uniformed officers in a special
operations section of the Chicago Police
Department.63 The officers were driving
the last car of a four-car caravan converg-
ing on an area known for heavy narcotics
trafficking.64
As the caravan passed a street, Officer
Nolan observed Wardlow standing next
to the building holding an opaque bag.65
Wardlow looked in the direction of the
officers and fled.66 The officers eventu-
ally cornered him on the street.67 Nolan
then exited the car and stopped
Wardlow.68 He immediately conducted a
protective patdown search for weapons
because in his experience it was common
for weapons to be found in the near
vicinity of narcotics transactions.69
Officer Nolan opened the bag and discov-
ered a .38 caliber handgun.70
The Illinois trial court denied
Wardlow’s motion to suppress, finding
the gun was recovered during a lawful
stop and frisk.71 The Illinois Court of
Appeals reversed, concluding that the
gun should have been suppressed
because Officer Nolan did not have rea-
sonable suspicion sufficient to justify a
Terry stop.72 The court found the evi-
dence presented by the state insufficient
to prove that Wardlow was found in a
high-crime area.73
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed,
but on a different basis than the interme-
diate appellate court.74 The Illinois
Supreme Court determined that sudden
flight in a high-crime area does not by
itself create a reasonable suspicion justi-
fying a Terry stop.75 The court concluded
that while police have a right to approach
individuals and ask questions, the indi-
vidual has no obligation to respond and
may simply go on his or her way.76 The
court then determined that flight may
simply be an exercise of this right to “go
on one’s way,” and thus, could not consti-
tute reasonable suspicion justifying a
Terry stop.77
The Supreme Court rejected this ratio-
nale and reversed.  The majority con-
cluded that flight, by its very nature, is
not “going about one’s business,” but is
just the opposite.78 The Court then reit-
erated its previous holdings, explaining
that an officer may conduct a brief intro-
ductory stop when an officer has a rea-
sonable, articulable suspicion that crimi-
nal activity is afoot.79 The determination
of reasonable suspicion is to be based on
commonsense judgments and inferences
about human behavior.80
The dissenting opinion focused on
how much weight should be given to
unprovoked flight in determining reason-
able suspicion.  After recognizing the fact
that sometimes those who flee may be
guilty of a crime, the dissent gave cre-
dence to the fact that there are those, par-
ticularly minorities, residing in high-
crime areas who flee because they believe
contact with the police itself can be dan-
gerous.81 The dissent argued that since
many factors provide innocent motiva-
tions for unprovoked flight in high-crime
areas, the character of the neighborhood
arguably makes an inference of guilt less
appropriate, rather than more so.82
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF
WARDLOW AND WHAT WILL THE
FUTURE HOLD? 
Will Location-Plus-Evasion Stops
Actually Reduce Crime?
Wardlow has removed the aura of
unconstitutionality regarding location
plus evasion in Terry stops.  The majority
justified its holding in part by reiterating
the fact that the officers in Wardlow were
in an area of expected criminal activity,
but noted that this standing alone is not
enough to support a reasonable suspi-
cion.83 The majority then turned to its
belief that evasion is suggestive of wrong-
doing.84 The two factors combined
would determine reasonable suspicion
due to commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior.85
This reasoning supported the Court’s
view that police need a freer hand to
combat crime and to protect them-
selves,86 but the majority offered no sup-
porting evidence that allowing location
plus evasion as a lawful basis for Terry
stops would do this.  While people may
avoid the police for a variety of reasons,
62. See State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1994) (finding that flight
alone, without other articulable suspicion of criminal activity,
does not meet Terry standards); see also State v. Hicks, 488
N.W.2d 359 (Neb. 1992)(holding that flight is sufficient to justify
an investigatory stop only when coupled with specific knowledge
connecting the person to involvement in criminal conduct).
63. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 121-22.
66. Id. at 122.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id.; see also People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ill. 1998)
(finding, contrary to the intermediate appellate court, that
Officer’s Nolan’s uncontradicted testimony was sufficient to estab-
lish that the incident occurred in a high-crime area).  
76. 528 U.S. at 122.
77. Id. at 123.
78. Id. at 125.  
79. Id. at 123 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
80. See id. at 125.
81. Id. at 132.
82. Id. at 139. 
83. Id. at 124. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 125. 
86. See generally Williams, 407 U.S. at 148 n.3 (noting that officers
have reasons to fear for safety, citing studies that found 97% of
policemen murdered in 1972 were killed by gunshot wounds and
30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer
approached a suspect seated in an automobile). 
Winter 2002 - Court Review 39
reported cases focus only on those with
guilty motivations.87 Others who are
without guilt are nevertheless stopped
and frisked.88 They are not charged
because the search yields no evidence and
no reported case results.89
Will the Strained Relationship
Between Minorities and the
Police Become Further
Aggravated?
The majority did not consider that
most of these location-plus-evasion stops
will involve disproportionately higher
amounts of minorities and certainly will
only involve those among the low-
income class of society.  Consequently,
these are the same people who are more
likely to evade police for reasons other
than guilt.90
The dissenting opinion recognized
that there are entirely innocent persons
residing in high-crime areas who have
reasons to flee from police.91 Using com-
piled data from several sources, the dis-
sent pointed to several specific reasons
one may have for evading police:  police
brutality,92 harassment,93 and racial
bias.94 These factors were given little, if
any, weight by the majority before render-
ing its opinion.   
The majority saw the intrusion of a
Terry stop as minimal and believed that
the Fourth Amendment accepts the risk
that innocent people may be temporarily
detained.95 The Court did not consider
that these “minimal intrusions” are more
than just physical—they are emotional as
well. Since the stops must be conducted
in high-crime areas, the innocent resi-
dents of those locations who are stopped
could feel stigmatized as criminals by law
enforcement simply due to their eco-
nomic status and legitimate fear of
police.96 This could lead to the commu-
nities most in need of police protection
regarding the police as a racist, occupying
force.97
How Much Weight Will the Court
Give an Officer’s Testimony?
The dissent also discussed the vague
testimony provided by Officer Nolan.98
Officer Nolan could not recall whether he
was driving in a marked or unmarked car,
or whether any of the other cars in the
caravan were marked.99 The testimony
also did not reveal whether anyone
besides Wardlow was nearby when the
incident occurred, nor how fast the cara-
vans were driving.100 The dissent rea-
soned that the testimony of Officer
Nolan’s observation gave insufficient
weight to the reasonable-suspicion analy-
sis.101
The majority and the Illinois trial
court seemed to trust Officer Nolan’s abil-
ity to interpret the situation and did not
question the gaps left after his testimony.
This is in line with the Court’s decision in
Cortez to allow officers to interpret evi-
dence because of their experience and
training in law enforcement. If Nolan
believed Wardlow fled after noticing the
caravan of cars containing officers, then it
is assumed by the Court to be true.  This
clearly demonstrates the overwhelming
power that police officers now possess in
determining reasonable suspicion.  
CONCLUSION
By allowing location plus evasion to
provide reasonable suspicion, the
Supreme Court has given police more
power to fulfill their obligations to the
public and to protect themselves from the
possible risks associated with crime pre-
vention.  Officers have been given the
authority to deem locations “high-crime”
areas. While in those areas, police are
allowed to stop and frisk anyone who
happens to flee from them, regardless of
the reason.  These benefits come with the
high price of depriving residents in low
income areas from the same protection
against personal invasion than those liv-
ing in more affluent parts of America.
Although some of the persons temporar-
ily detained by officers will be guilty of
some crime, the majority will not, leaving
the taste of bitter resentment toward law
enforcement and a greater probability of
police evasion again in the future. 
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